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Why the deferred annuity makes sense
Anran Chen ∗, Steven Haberman and Stephen Thomas
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The low demand of immediate annuities at retirement has been a long-
standing puzzle. We show that a hyperbolic discount model can explain this
behaviour and results in attractiveness of long-term deferred annuities. We
find that a 65-year-old male would pay 24 percent higher than the fair price
for a 30-year deferred annuity. Moreover, if governments were to introduce
a pre-commitment device which requires pensioners to make annuitisation
decisions 10 years before retirement, the take up rate of annuities could
become higher.
Keywords: Hyperbolic discounting, Deferred annuities, Annuity puzzle, Reservation
price.
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, the traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan has been
gradually losing its dominance in private sector pension systems in many countries and
the defined contribution (DC) pension plan has become increasingly popular. Under
the DC pension scheme, members contribute towards their personal pension savings in
a way that enables them to make decisions on how to invest during the accumulation
stage and how to decumulate during retirement.
In the area of retirement, a constant focus is on whether retirees receive adequate
protection against longevity risk, the risk of outliving one’s wealth. As an insurance
product that eliminates the longevity risk, a lifetime annuity is a good option for DC
pensioners. A lifetime annuity provides a stream of income payments for as long as the
annuitant is alive, in exchange for an upfront premium charge. Yaari (1965) demonstrates
that in a life-cycle model a risk-averse individual without a bequest motive should hold all
their assets in annuities. However, empirical data has shown that retirees are reluctant to
convert retirement savings into annuities. The disparity between the theoretical optimal
choice and consumers’ actual preferences leads to the “annuity puzzle”. This can be
illustrated by low levels of voluntary annuitisation in the UK market. In the past,
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the UK had two distinct annuity markets: a voluntary segment called the Purchased
Life Annuity (PLA) market and a compulsory section called the Compulsory Purchase
Annuity (CPA). Based on UK annuity sales figures for the 1994-2006, sales in the CPA
market had been consistently higher than that in the PLA market. By 2010, the CPA
market had grown to £11.5 billion worth of annuity premiums while the PLA market
only had £72 million worth of sales (Cannon & Tonks, 2011).
Recently, the UK government implemented pension reforms to encourage free choice
of the mode of pension distribution and, as a result, retirees’ real preferences on annuity
products could be clearly seen. The reform follows the international trend of greater
pension flexibility, which has been observed in countries such as the USA, Australia and
Switzerland. Prior to the 2014 UK reform, there were strict restrictions on accessing
pension savings at retirement. For example, if a pensioner had overall pension savings
of greater than £18, 000 but could not access a guaranteed retirement income of more
than £20, 000 per year 1, the only two choices that could make were to either to buy
an annuity or enroll in a “capped drawdown”, which allowed them to withdraw as much
as 120 percent of an equivalent annuity each year during retirement. However, after
the above mentioned policy change, everyone will be able to choose a lump sum (full
withdrawal), an annuity or a drawdown, regardless of the size of their pension wealth
(HM Treasury, 2014). With this move towards greater freedom of choice on how and
when to access pension wealth, annuity sales have experienced a large decline. In Q2
2015, £990m was invested in annuities, showing a 44 percent decrease from the £1.8bn
invested in Q2 2014. Moreover, 18, 200 annuities had been purchased in the three months
after the pension reform, showing a 61 percent decrease compared to Q2 2014 when
46, 700 were purchased (ABI, 2015).
Many studies have suggested a number of reasons for the annuity puzzle, such as
mortality risk-sharing among families (Brown & Poterba, 2000) and the existence of
social security (Butler et al., 2016). Some research has examined the possible influences
of behavioural factors such as the framing effect, cumulative prospect theory and low
level of financial literacy. The findings suggest that the low demand for annuity could
be simply due to irrational behaviour (Cannon & Tonks, 2008).
Since the annuity is a product that involves a series of payments at different points of
time, one of the behavioural factors that affects decision making is the inconsistency of
intertemporal choices. More specifically, when people assign values to future payouts, the
discount rate used to evaluate intertemporal choice is not fixed, but varies in line with the
length of the delay period, size and signs of the benefits. This effect is called hyperbolic
discounting and is interpreted as “temporal myopia”. The concept has been widely used
to account for behavioural bias in savings, nutrition, healthcare, drug addictions, and
other problems of willpower (Frederick et al., 2002). Laibson et al. (2003) have used
the model to explain the puzzle of simultaneously having large credit card debts and
pre-retirement savings.
In this paper, we use the hyperbolic discount model derived from experimental results
1A guaranteed retirement annual income of £20, 000 is equivalent as a total pension savings of around
£310, 000 , according to stylised assumptions and calculations in HM Treasury (2014).
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to analyse annuitisation decisions. We are interested in both immediate annuities and
deferred annuities. The deferred annuity is a contract that is purchased today but does
not pay until the annuitant survives to a pre-specified age. Compared with a conventional
immediate annuity, a deferred annuity has competitive advantages of a much lower price
and provides almost the same level of longevity insurance; therefore, it has aroused
much discussion in the area of retirement financial planning (see Milevsky, 2005; Gong
& Webb, 2010; Denuit et al., 2015). To uncover the annuitisation decisions of people
at different ages, two types of deferred annuities are studied: a working age deferred
annuity (WADA), which is purchased at working age and starts paying at retirement,
and a retirement age deferred annuity (RADA), which is purchased at retirement and
starts paying a few years later. To be more specific, we seek to explore four questions:
1. Can we use the hyperbolic discount model to explain the low demand for immediate
annuities at retirement and at a more advanced age?
2. Are pensioners at 65 years old interested in purchasing a RADA?
3. Would people at working age have an interest in purchasing a WADA?
4. How would working-age members respond to a question asking them to decide
today whether to buy an immediate annuity at retirement?
To seek the answers to these questions, we adopt the hyperbolic discount model to
evaluate the perceived value of an annuity, which enables us to work out the reservation
price. By comparing the reservation price with the theoretical market price we can
determine whether an individual would choose an annuity or not. We show that time
inconsistent preference is one of the factors that stops retirees from converting their DC
account balances into annuities at retirement. More importantly, we identify a high
willingness to purchase long-term deferred annuities for hyperbolic discounters, both at
working age and in retirement. As the deferred period increases, the relative difference
between reservation price and actuarial price increases considerably and at a much faster
rate. Furthermore, if members are simply asked to make a decision on annuity purchase
and could delay the action until the point of retirement, those with ten years until
retirement value the longevity protection the most.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of
the explanation for the annuity puzzle from both the rational and irrational framework.
In section 3, a detailed introduction of the hyperbolic model is offered. In section
4, we explain how the annuities in the four questions above are evaluated and how
the maximum acceptable price is derived. Major results and a sensitivity analysis are
presented in sections 5 and 6. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude with major findings and
limitations of this study.
2 Literature review
Yaari (1965) is the first to demonstrate the benefits of annuitisation in a life cycle
model with an uncertain lifetime. He shows that a rational investor should invest his
3
retirement savings in annuities rather than bonds to finance retirement. This result
rests on three fundamental assumptions: a complete annuity market, a specific utility
function (additive separability) and the absence of a bequest motive. The subsequent
literature on annuities has relaxed one or two of these assumptions in order to assess if
these factors lead to the low demand for annuities.
Annuities in a rational framework
Observing the annuity market from the supply side, a less competitive price could be
the reason for low demand. Brown & Warshawsky (2001) calculate the money’s worth
value of an annuity using average mortality rates of the population and find that an
individual could expect to receive only 85 pence per pound invested, thus justifying the
existence of adverse selection in annuity pricing.
Since an annuity stops paying once the annuitant dies, people with a motive to be-
queath part of their wealth obtain less welfare by purchasing a life annuity. A large
literature has focused on how the bequest motive impacts the demand for annuities and
shows that a strong bequest motive can eliminate the desire to purchase annuities (see
Friedman & Warshawsky, 1990; Vidal-Melia & Lejarraga-Garcia, 2006; Lockwood, 2012).
Intra-family mortality sharing can also be regarded as a substitute for an annuity.
Since families often share a common budget constraint, mortality risk sharing among
family members can offer a substitution for risk sharing in the annuity market. To an
extent, this resembles the bequest motive; an individual who dies early leaves his wealth
to subsidise other family members who are alive. Brown & Poterba (2000) find evidence
showing that the utility gain from annuitisation for a couple is significantly lower than
that for single people.
An alternative explanation for the low demand for additional annuitisation is the
existence of social security and private DB pension plans. According to Dushi & Webb
(2004), an exceptionally high proportion of a retired household’s wealth has been pre-
annuitised before retirement. Therefore, without purchasing an annuity in the open
market, these retirees already have a minimum level of income that will last for life.
Butler et al. (2016) also prove that the presence of social security reduces the value of
annuitisation.
A more recent discussion relates to the worry about health care expenditure shocks
at an older age and the fact that retirees may not need the smooth consumption that
an annuity provides. It is true that people have a higher probability of falling ill when
they become older; they may also have to make some age-specific investments in a house
such as installing a stair lift. Therefore we have reason to believe that a rational retiree
might want to live a very simple life in their early retirement period so that they can
save for unexpected health-related expenses (Sinclair & Smetters, 2004).
Lastly, while most research focuses on a comparison of full annuitisation aged 65 with
the alternative of never annuitising, in practice, a retiree can choose between annuitising
now and delaying the decision until the next period. They can also annuitise only
a fraction of their wealth and enter a drawdown of the rest. Gavranovic (2011) has
demonstrated that the optimal annuitisation strategy for a pensioner without bequest
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motive is to gradually convert all pension wealth to annuities by around age 80.
Annuities in a behavioural framework
The literature mentioned above seeks to solve the annuity puzzle within a strictly rational
framework. In recent years, however, there is an extensive literature on the behavioural
economics of retirement savings. This moves beyond the fully rational paradigm and
proposes some behavioural factors that could play important roles in determining how
retirees spend their retirement savings.
One important issue is the flaws in the expected utility hypothesis that arise from risk
aversion. Hu & Scott (2007) have explained the annuity puzzle by assuming that retirees
are loss-averse rather than risk-averse, and make annuity decisions based on Cumulative
Prospect Theory. They also extend the application of Cumulative Prospect Theory to
deferred annuities and guaranteed annuities, proving that the deferred annuity becomes
optimal only when the first payment starts at or after age 93. The framing effect, which
states that individuals’ behaviour depends heavily on the way in which available choices
are presented, is also one of the influencing factors considered by Brown et al. (2008).
They have shown that 72 percent of subjects prefer an annuity rather than a savings
account when the choice is framed in terms of consumption while 12 percent subjects
choose an annuity when it is framed in terms of an investment. Other behavioural factors
include the poor financial education of retirees and regret aversion (Cannon & Tonks,
2008).
3 An introduction to the hyperbolic discount model
In dealing with individuals’ annuitisation decisions and other economic decisions that
involve outcomes occurring at different points in time, researchers often use a discounted
utility framework to model such decisions. In a normative framework, the discount func-
tion adopted is often the exponential discount model, which assumes that the discount
rate is constant over time and is independent of money amounts (or utilities). This often
leads to a conclusion that individuals’ preferences are stationary over time, i.e. they have
time-consistent preferences. In real world, many empirical studies have observed anoma-
lies in actual behaviour compared with what is predicted by the exponential discount
function. Three major anomalies are concluded. First, people tend to act impulsively
in the short-term but become more patient in the long-term. In other words, the im-
plicit rate at which people discount future rewards will vary inversely with the length of
waiting time. Thaler (1981) illustrates this with a simple example. Subjects are asked
to state their preferences on two questions: “Would you prefer one apple today or two
apples tomorrow?” and “Would you prefer one apple in one year or two apples in one
year plus one day?”. According to the exponential discounting method, people who
choose one apple today should make consistent choice of one apple in a year. However,
empirical results show that a significant fraction of subjects that prefer one apple today
would gladly wait one extra day in a year in order to receive two apples instead. Second,
the implicit discount rates with regard to different reward sizes would not stay the same.
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Thaler (1981) finds that the subjects are indifferent between receiving $15 immediately
and $60 in a year, between $250 now and $350 in a year, and between an immediate
$3000 and $4000 in a year, which means large reward sizes have lower discount rates
compared with small reward sizes. Third, there is a gain-loss asymmetry in terms of
discounting. For example, Loewenstein (1987) finds that a group of subjects, on average,
are indifferent between receiving an immediate $10 and receiving $21 in a year; but are
indifferent between paying $10 immediately and paying $15 in a year. Similarly, the
indifferent amount for receiving or paying an immediate $100 were receiving $157 or
paying $133 respectively in a year.
The anomalies introduced above can be addressed by a hyperbolic discount model,
which has been widely applied to explain the problem of addiction and self control.
As an example, people with low self-control often gain too much weight and find it
difficult to improve their health by doing more exercise and having a diet. These people
often vow to forgo all future temptations, in exchange for improved health in the future;
however, when they have their next meal, they cannot resist having unhealthy fried
food and sweet desserts. Presumably, they prefer this because the instant pleasure
delivered by delicious food is greater than the heavily discounted future rewards of health.
Therefore, the hyperbolic discount model is appropriate to describe the situation that
people simultaneously require immediate satisfactions and make commitments for the
future.
Loewenstein & Prelec (1992) collectively present the experimental evidence and pro-
pose an explicit hyperbolic discount model to address the effect.
δ(t) = (1 + αt)−
β
α with α > 0, β > 0 (1)
where δ(t) is a discount function; α and β determines how much the function departs
from constant exponential discounting.
To identify the parameter values that capture most people’s intertemporal preferences,
Abdellaoui et al. (2009) conduct a well-designed choice test and concluded that the
“Power discount model” with δ(t) = (1 + t)−β provides the best fit. Relying on this
result, we use β equals 0.19 for gains and 0.11 for losses in our analysis. Please note that
value of β would vary with country/cultural background of the selected group of subjects
and this limitation is embedded in the experimental design. Therefore, in section 6, the
sensitivity of the parameter of β is explored, to show that the conclusions do not entirely
depend on the chosen value of the parameter.
Figure 1 here
Figure 1 provides a comparison between the hyperbolic discounting and exponential
discounting models. The horizontal axis represents the waiting time to receive £1 and
the vertical axis is the present value of the £1 to be received. The present value follow-
ing hyperbolic discounting decreases at a much faster rate in early years than following
exponential discounting, which means that the hyperbolic discounters adopt a higher
level of discounting for benefits that come in the early years than exponential discoun-
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ters. However, if the benefits are to be received after 20 years (the intersection point),
hyperbolic discounters believe it has a higher value than exponential discounters.
In addition to the discount function, a descriptive value function is also required in a
complete discounted utility framework. Loewenstein & Prelec (1992) discuss the neces-
sary characteristics of the value function without providing an explicit descriptive model.
Abdellaoui et al. (2009) design a parameter-free measurement of utility in intertempo-
ral choices and hence derive the value function which addresses the absolute magnitude
effect and the gain-loss asymmetry. The value function v(ct) is as follows with γ being
equal to 0.97 and θ being equal to 0.84. It is assumed to be separable and additive over
time as recorded in literature.
v(ct) =
{ −(−ct)γ if ct < 0
cθt if ct ≥ 0 (2)
where ct represents the consumption rate that would take place at a future time t,
which is defined on the interval [0,T], and v(ct) represents the value of the consumption
amount.
The discount rates and the value function are combined to arrive at the overall value
of consumption streams.
V (c0, c1, ..., cT ) =
T∑
t=0
(δ(t)× v(ct)) (3)
A standard approach in the literature has been to use the exponential discount model
for δ(t) and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function for v(ct). In this
analysis, we instead use the hyperbolic discount model in Equation (1) and the value
function given by Equation (2) to analyse annuity purchase decisions by considering the
effect of subjective views on the underlying consumption streams.
4 Annuity Valuation
In this section, we introduce four scenarios to address the questions of annuitisation
decisions for people at different stages. Two types of annuities, immediate annuities and
deferred annuities, are discussed in this paper and they are priced at actuarially fair
rates. In order to make a fair decision, the overall utility, V , of the investment in each
scenario will be calculated. As we focus on people who show “temporal myopia”, the
amount of money is evaluated based on Equation (2) and time preference is modeled
by the “power discount model”, Equation (1). Let tpx denote the probability that an
x-year-old person can survive for t years and the maximum attainable age is set to be
120. Four scenarios are described in detail below and the corresponding valuation of the
annuity investment is introduced.
a. Immediate annuities for retirees
Consider a retiree at age x(x ≥ 65) who needs to make a decision on whether to spend
a lump sum amount A to purchase an immediate annuity which pays ψ per annum in
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advance. The overall value of this investment for the x-year-old is:
V1(x) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=x
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ)) (4)
b. RADA for retirees
Consider a 65-year-old pensioner (x = 65) who has just retired. The individual is faced
with a wide variety of RADA products which have deferred periods (d) from 1 to 30
years. By investing the pension lump sum amount A in a d-year deferred annuity, the
pensioner is entitled to a lifelong guaranteed annual income of ψ in d years. However,
nothing is paid back if he dies within the deferred period. The overall value of this
deferred annuity investment at the time of purchase is:
V2(d) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=65+d
(δ(i− 65)× i−65p65 × v(ψ)) (5)
c. Working Age Deferred Annuity (WADA) for working age individuals
An individual at age x (25 ≤ x ≤ 64) considers investing in a WADA which provides
annual incomes of ψ once the annuitant survives to retirement age 65. The overall
perceived value of this investment at the time of purchase is:
V3(x) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=65
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ)) (6)
d. Decision on purchasing an immediate annuity at retirement for working
age individuals
In this scenario pension scheme members within the working age range (25 ≤ x ≤ 64)
are asked to make decisions in advance on whether to choose a pension lump sum A
at age 65 or a corresponding fair annuity starting at the same age. When evaluating
this annuity, the cash flows involved are exactly the same as the immediate annuity
purchased at age 65 (scenario a); however the perceived value may be different because
the decision is made at an earlier age. If an individual decides to convert the lump sum
A into an annuity at retirement, the overall perceived value of this investment for the
individual is:
V4(x) = δ(65− x)× 65−xpx × v(−A) +
119∑
i=65
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ)) (7)
To determine whether an actuarially fairly priced annuity is attractive to purchase,
we follow Hu & Scott (2007) to use the “relative difference between reservation price
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and fair price”, R, as the benchmark measure:
R =
Reservation Price−Actuarially fair price
Actuarially fair price
The “reservation price”, also called the “maximum acceptable price”, is the annuity
price that would make an individual indifferent to buying an annuity. According to
the valuation functions above, the reservation price is the initial price, A, that makes
the hyperbolic present value of an annuity, V , equal to zero. If the reservation price
is below the market price, the annuity would not be attractive for individuals to buy.
Therefore, a positive R means individuals are willing to purchase a fairly priced annuity,
and a higher value of R implies greater willingness to purchase an annuity. R can also
be interpreted as the percentage more or less than the market price that an individual
would be prepared to pay for a product.
5 Results
In this analysis, we assume the annuity price is actuarially fair with no expenses or
profit loading. The price calculation is based on the UK mortality table “S2PML2”,
which describes the mortality experience of UK male pensioners of self-administered
pension schemes for the period from 2004 to 2011, and a constant interest rate of 3
percent. Annual income from annuity, ψ, is assumed to be 1 unit. Therefore, the fair
market price of the annuity and the reservation price that individuals would like to
pay can be calculated accordingly. In what follows, we provide results for the relative
price differences, R, under the four different scenarios, analyse the attitudes of investors
towards each type of annuity and discuss the trend of the relative price differences with
regard to investors’ age or the length of the deferred period.
a. Immediate annuities for retirees
The results of the Relative Price Differences (R) with regard to different ages of purchase
are presented in Figure 2. Two major conclusions can be drawn from the figure. First,
all the outcomes in terms of R are negative, which means that for a group of retirees
who are aged between 65 and 95, fairly priced immediate annuities are unattractive
to purchase. Thus, evaluating annuitisation decisions by assuming time inconsistent
preferences is indeed a powerful behavioural explanation for retirees’ not converting
their defined contribution account balances into annuities. Secondly, as a newly retired
pensioner becomes older, his preference for the immediate annuity declines at first and
then increases after he reaches age 85. However, the relative difference in price is small
with R lying in the range of −3% and −10%.
The results presented appear to be inconsistent with more recent research carried out
by Schreiber & Weber (2015), who find that the expected present value of an immediate
annuity declines monotonically with the age of purchase. Although both studies use the
2Source: Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013).
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power discounting model for annuity evaluation, different groups of people are targeted:
Schreiber & Weber (2015) survey working age individuals while we focus on retirees
above age 65; and this may explain the inconsistency.
Figure 2 here
b. Retirement Age Deferred Annuity (RADA) for retirees
Figure 3 shows the attractiveness of RADA with different deferred periods for a 65-year-
old retiree. It can be seen that although recently-retired individuals are reluctant to
purchase immediate annuities, they are willing to pay a higher-than-market price for
annuities with long deferred periods. From our modelling results, annuities that are
deferred for more than 10 years are generally welcomed by 65-year-old retirees. Further-
more, we identify a positive relationship between the length of the deferred period and
the attractiveness of the corresponding deferred annuity. If an annuity has a deferred pe-
riod of 30 years, a 65-year-old individual would be prepared to pay 24% greater than the
fair price 3. This is a much higher margin than that for an immediate annuity. It implies
that such a product would have commercial potential since insurance companies could
add a greater loading in deferred annuity products without changing its attractiveness.
The popularity of deferred annuities have also been identified in other works. Hu &
Scott (2007) adopt Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to evaluate deferred annuities
with deferred periods of 0, 10, 20 and 30 years and find that the 30-year deferred annuity
is the most attractive to buy. In Chen et al. (2016), we also show that the attractiveness
of deferred annuity increases with the length of the deferred period, according to CPT.
Figure 3 here
c. Working Age Deferred Annuity (WADA) for working age individuals
Figure 4 here
If individuals at working age are given the opportunity to enter a deferred annuity
contract that promises retirement incomes depending upon survival, their reactions are
examined and reflected in Figure 4. It can be seen that although people who are retired
are unsure of handing over a lump sum of money to insurance companies in exchange
for a longevity protection, most people at working age tend to find a WADA attractive
to buy. Another interesting point worthy of note is that the decision maker’s age has
a negative effect on the attractiveness of this type of deferred annuity. For hyperbolic
discounters younger than 30-year-old, they appear even to be willing to pay double the
price of the WADA.
We know that as the length of deferred period increases, the actuarially fair price of
a deferred annuity which provides the same level of protection becomes cheaper; hence
younger individuals would be less hesitant to purchase a WADA which involves a smaller
3Please note the choice of 30-year deferred period is for the purpose of illustration. In reality, the
product may be available.
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initial outlay. In addition, given the assumption that people have time inconsistent pref-
erences, a young individual tends to overvalue all the annuity incomes that come in the
distant future; however for an older individual, some of the deferred annuity payments
are highly likely to be undervalued. The results are consistent with our conclusions in
scenario b. Purchasing the pension annuities at an earlier age means a longer deferred
period, and in both scenarios an annuity with a longer deferred period is more attractive.
The magnitude of R is much higher in scenario c than in scenario b because a longer
deferred period is considered.
Some of our findings mirror those suggested elsewhere. Shu et al. (2016) have con-
ducted a choice-based stated-preference survey of adults aged between 45 and 65 and
find that younger subjects report a higher likelihood of purchases for annuities beginning
at age 65 than older subjects who are closer in age to the start date. DiCenzo et al.
(2011) have also discovered that pre-retirees have stronger preferences for annuities than
retirees based on online experimental research with 1,009 subjects aged between 45 and
75.
d. Decision on purchasing an immediate annuity at retirement for working age
individuals
Figure 5 here
Similar to the third scenario, we aim to discover the attitude of working age pension
scheme members towards an annuity with the first payment starting when pensioners
retire at age 65. Although the annuity investment payoffs are exactly the same, the
purchase is made at different points. In scenario c, the price is paid now at age x while
in scenario d, pensioners simply make a decision at age x but delay the purchase action
until age 65. If an individual dies prior to the time of retirement, his financial status
remain unchanged in scenario d but he faces an absolute loss of the price paid in scenario
c. Therefore, scenario d effectively deals with the decision to buy an immediate annuity
rather than a deferred annuity.
Comparing the results of R in Figure 5 with those in Figure 4, we identify a different
pattern. For individuals below age 55, the attractiveness of the annuity increases slightly
with age. However for individuals above age 55, the attractiveness declines sharply with
age and becomes unattractive when individuals reach age 65. Therefore, we suggest that
policy makers who want to promote annuitisation in public ask individuals to make a
choice between lump sum and annuities 10 years before retirement. On the other hand,
one may notice that the change in R is relatively small, varying between 4% and 8%. It
is similar to the results for immediate annuities in scenario a.
These findings confirm those in the survey by Schreiber & Weber (2015). In their
survey, subjects are asked to predict whether they will annuitise if they were at age
66. The total sample results show that the effect of age on the decision to purchase an
annuity is negative. However, observing the answers from a subsample of individuals
below age 51, the effect is no longer statistically significant. To some extent, it reveals
that people above age 51 have significant decreasing preferences towards annuities.
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6 Sensitivity analysis
Previously, we assumed that each parameter value in the annuity calculations is based on
Abdellaoui et al. (2009). However, questions remain on whether the behavioural biases
would be stronger or weaker for people with different levels of impatience, different
income levels or different health status. In this section, we test the sensitivity of the
interest rate, the power discounting parameter, the income levels and mortality rates
(by changing mortality tables).
Table 1 here
Table 1 shows the results for R in Scenario a and Scenario b under different combina-
tions of assumptions. The row HB baseline lists the standard results that are based on
the benchmark assumptions in Abdellaoui et al. (2009). In the HB sensitivity analysis,
we change one factor listed in each row at a time so that we can observe the impact of
that factor on R. “Less” or “greater” is relative to the baseline results. Each column
represents different types of annuity products with the first payment starting at a dif-
ferent age. For example, an annuity starts paying at age 75 represents an immediate
annuity purchased at age 75 in Scenario a and a 10-year deferred annuity purchased at
age 65 in Scenario b.
Figure 6 here
The first factor that is of interest is the interest rate, which is an important factors in
pricing an annuity. As the interest rate moves from lower (r = 1%) to higher (r = 3%),
results of R consistently increase, for all types of immediate annuities and deferred
annuities. It is simply because a higher interest rate leads to a lower annuity price, which
helps investors lock in a high rate of return. For immediate annuity purchasers (scenario
a), it is better to choose an annuity starting at age 65 when the interest rate is high;
however, it is better to delay the purchase when rate in the market is low. For deferred
annuities, the interest rate is of less concern compared with immediate annuities (because
a smaller number of payments will be discounted). The attractiveness of deferred annuity
will depend on the relative level of patience of investors. For an individual with a certain
level of impatience, they tend to overvalue future benefits more heavily when interest
rate is higher. Therefore longer-term annuity becomes more attractive in a high interest
rate environment.
Another factor that we look into is the level of impatience, measured by β. Given
that the annuity pricing rate is deterministic, a higher β means that the decision maker
adopts a heavier undervaluation of earlier benefits and a lighter overvaluation of later
benefits. Reflecting on the curves in Figure 6, the intersection point between exponen-
tial discounting and hyperbolic discounting would come at a later stage as β increases.
Comparing our baseline results with less/greater impatience for both immediate annu-
ities and RADA, we conclude that the attractiveness of annuity products is consistently
lower in response to a greater level of impatience. This makes sense intuitively since
an individual with a greater level of impatience would have stronger present bias; they
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would gain much higher satisfaction from consuming now rather than converting the
lump sum into future cash flows and consuming regularly. According to Table 1, rel-
atively patient individuals (β = 0.15) are willing to pay a slightly higher price, 4.82%
and 1.64% respectively, for immediate annuities at age 65 and 70. It is because they are
patient to wait and assign more weights to future incomes. Investment opportunities
that convert current consumption into a future stream of cash flow are attractive to
them. The same reasons lead to the attractiveness of deferred annuities for this group
of people (see the row corresponding to β = 0.15 in Scenario b).
The effect of annuity income levels is examined to capture the variation in decisions
of people with different wealth levels. Two levels of annual income, 0.07214 unit and 3
units, are adopted to represent relatively poor people and relatively rich people. Based
on the value function in the hyperbolic discount model introduced above, people tend to
overvalue the amount of less than one unit and undervalue the amount of greater than one
unit. This is reasonable since people often place more values on the initial accumulation
of amount of money and this portion of money is intended for the purchase of necessities
such as food, utilities and rent. Therefore, the results corresponding to ψ = 0.0721 and
ψ = 3 in Scenario a and Scenario b show that wealthy people who can afford an annuity
with higher annual incomes are willing to pay a lower-than-market price, while poor
people are willing to pay a much higher-than-market price for annuities.
The mortality table in the calculation of baseline results is based on S2PML, the mor-
tality experience of male pensioners from 2004 to 2011. Two other mortality tables are
selected for comparison: S2PFL, the mortality experience of female pensioners during
the same period, representing a group with lighter mortality, and SPML03, the mor-
tality experience of male pensioners between 2000 and 2006, representing a group with
heavier mortality. Results in Scenario a show pensioners with the highest mortality rates
(SPML03) tend to find immediate annuities the least attractive. Similarly, female pen-
sioners with the highest life expectancies (S2PFL) show the greatest interest in RADA,
as is observed in Scenario b.
Table 2 here
Table 2 shows the results in terms of R in Scenario c and Scenario d. In Table 2, we
can see the sensitivity of four factors: the interest rate, the level of impatience, the level
of income and mortality rates, on the annuitisation decisions.
The sensitivity analysis of the interest rate in Scenario c and Scenario d again shows
that annuities are generally attractive in a high interest rate environment. Moreover, as
deferred period increase, the increase in attractiveness (R) is greater when interest rate
is higher. As explained previously, the reason behind is that an individual with a certain
level of impatience would overvalue future benefits more heavily when interest rate is
higher. When deferred period is greater than a certain number of years, it is possible
that all payments will be overvalued.
4The value is chosen as the annual income from converting one unit at age 65-year-old into an immediate
annuity.
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By comparing results corresponding to β = 0.15 and β = 0.25, we find those at
working age see annuities as more valuable when they experience less impatience. In
addition, for decision makers with different levels of impatience, the effect of their age
on the WADA’s attractiveness is consistently negative. In other words, the longer the
waiting period to receive the first annuity income is, the higher the possibility of purchase
will be. The intuition behind these features is as follows: incomes that arrive further in
the future are more likely to be overvalued and thus the deferred annuity with a longer
waiting period has a higher maximum acceptable price.
In Scenario d where the real purchase of an immediate annuity is delayed until re-
tirement, we have shown in the baseline results, which assume that β is 0.19 for gains
and 0.11 for losses in the power discount function, that people have the greatest interest
in buying an annuity around age 55. However in the sensitivity analysis when we let
discount rates for gains and losses be the same, the peak in the trend of R disappears
and we see a gradual decrease of value of R relative to the age of decision making.
In such a case, governments may simply encourage individuals to make annuitisation
decisions earlier rather than 10 years before retirement. Whether people use different
discount rates for gains and losses and the resulting impact on annuitisation decisions
needs future research.
Results corresponding to ψ = 0.0721 and ψ = 3 in Scenario c Scenario d show that
wealthy decision makers who can afford an annuity with a high annual income tend to
find annuities less attractive. The impact of income levels on the annuity purchasing
behaviour are consistent for decision makers at all ages 5.
The sensitivity of mortality rates in Table 2 indicates intuitively that annuities are
more attractive for individuals with longer life expectancies, regardless of the age of
decision making and the age of annuity purchase. Furthermore, for different mortality
groups, age presents a negative influence on the attractiveness of a WADA. If the an-
nuitisation decision needs to be made at working age and the actual purchases could
be delayed until retirement, those between 50 and 55 are the most likely to choose an
annuity and a strong decline in annuity preferences exists for pensioners older than 55.
7 Conclusions
Although purchasing an annuity at retirement can guarantee lifetime incomes, people
are reluctant to spend their retirement savings on annuities voluntarily. In the UK,
with fewer restrictions on accessing retirement savings, the demand for annuities has
decreased and thus insurance companies are making efforts to design more attractive
annuity products. This paper discusses the implication of one behavioural factor, the
hyperbolic discount model, on the annuity purchase.
Based on the analysis, we have the following primary findings. First, for an 65-year-
old retiree, the reservation price of an immediate annuity is lower than the market price,
5The results presented here are a reflection of our model; hence highly depending on whether the annual
income is greater than one unit or not. This model does not consider other sources of income.
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and thus the hyperbolic discount method captures the low demand for annuities at
retirement, seen in practice.
Second, under the hyperbolic discount model, deferred annuities are attractive for
pension scheme members at all ages. The attractiveness generally increases with the
deferred period. For instance, those below the age of 30 would pay more than double
the market price for the WADA. However, our model does not account for factors such
as affordability, a liquidity requirement and expected retirement living standards. While
a 25-year-old man who wants to receive an annual annuity income of £40, 000 after
retirement might find a 40-year deferred annuity attractive; he will most probably not
be able to afford the annuity price of £150, 034.6 6 at this young age. With time passing,
he will accumulate wealth and set aside a portion for retirement protection. Often, there
will be a point when accumulated retirement savings equals deferred annuity price; this
is the optimal age of purchase.
We recommend using the deferred annuity contract as a retirement solution because
it requires a smaller initial investment than the immediate annuity and provides simi-
lar longevity insurance. In addition, based on the fact that analytical cognitive function
ability declines dramatically for older adults, it would be wise to buy a RADA to protect
consumption at very advanced ages. For those in their 80s, it has been shown that 20
percent have been fully diagnosed dementia and 30 percent have severe cognitive impair-
ment; and thus, it would be difficult for these individuals to make rational withdrawal
decisions if there were no income protection in place (Laibson, 2009).
In scenario d, we observe that individuals around the age of 55 are those who would
most likely commit to buying an immediate annuity at the point of retirement. There-
fore, a policy recommendation can be drawn. With the aim of promoting the purchase of
annuities among retirees and releasing the burden from social benefit claiming, govern-
ments are advised to introduce a pre-commitment device asking people to make annuiti-
sation decisions 10 years before retirement. When they reach retirement, their original
decisions could be changed but some efforts, such as making a phone call or writing a
letter, are required. In fact, in Denmark, the decisions on annuity purchases can be made
during the accumulation period. As a result, about 50 percent of defined contribution
assets are used to buy WADA type products for those aged in their 40’s, 50’s and 60’s
(Andersen & Skjodt, 2008).
Although we have shown that inconsistent time preference is one of the reasons for
the annuity puzzle, our study has several limitations, which come from the way that
the hyperbolic discount model is calibrated in Abdellaoui et al. (2009). In summary,
there are three major limitations. First, the discount model was built using the concept
of consumption, but Abdellaoui et al. (2009) study the discounting of money amounts.
Consumption is different from money amounts since a decision maker who has no liquid-
ity constraints would not consider his preferences when valuing money amounts. Hence,
experimental results do not measure the true discount function, but a combination of
the discount function, liquidity constraints and bounded rational thinking about money.
6The price is the actuarially fair annuity price based on assumptions of 3% annual real rate of return,
mortality table S2PML and zero profit loading.
15
Second, subjects in the experiment were young university students who may share com-
plete different views about money and time discounting compared to older workers and
retirees. Their views may reflect a specific cultural or country background as well. Third,
the money amounts in the experimental questions are much smaller than the size of one’s
pension savings. Overall, the results provide a more qualitative rather than a precise
quantitative explanation of the relative attractiveness of annuities.
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Figure 1: A comparison of hyperbolic discounting and exponential discounting
Notes: Vertical axis, discount function, represents the present value of £1 to be received at
time t. We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent for exponential discounting; α = 1 and
β = 0.19 for hyperbolic discounting.
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Figure 2: the Relative Price Difference (R) of immediate annuities for retirees at age (x)
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Figure 3: the Relative Price Difference (R) of d-year retirement age deferred annuities
(RADA) for 65-year-old retirees
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Figure 4: the Relative Price Difference (R) of d-year working age deferred annuities
(WADA) for working age individuals at age (x)
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Figure 5: the Relative Price Difference (R) of an immediate annuity purchased at retire-
ment for working age individuals at age (x)
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Figure 6: A comparison of hyperbolic discounting with different levels of impatience
Notes: We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent for exponential discounting; α = 1 for
hyperbolic discounting.
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Table 1: Sensitivity analysis of the Relative Price Difference (R) in Scenario a and Sce-
nario b
R
Age of first annuity payment
65 70 75 80 85
Scenario a
HB baseline −3.60% −5.84% −7.51% −8.57% −8.99%
HB sensitivity analysis
Lower interest rate (r = 1%) −20.00% −19.32% −18.33% −17.01% −15.39%
Higher interest rate (r = 5%) 13.59% 8.08% 3.48% −0.11% −2.66%
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 4.82% 1.64% −0.97% −2.95% −4.28%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) −14.76% −15.83% −16.33% −16.21% −15.45%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 34.08% 30.30% 27.06% 24.29% 21.86%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −15.81% −17.55% −18.72% −19.22% −18.99%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PFL) −1.94% −4.57% −6.65% −8.11% −8.89%
Greater mortality rates (SPML03) −4.65% −6.63% −8.03% −8.82% −9.00%
Scenario b
HB baseline −3.60% −3.50% 0.09% 5.15% 11.10%
HB sensitivity analysis
Lower interest rate (r = 1%) −20.00% −25.03% −27.35% −28.88% −30.22%
Higher interest rate (r = 5%) 13.59% 21.95% 35.74% 53.29% 74.58%
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 4.82% 7.22% 12.47% 19.15% 26.80%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) −14.76% −17.54% −15.94% −12.83% −8.87%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 34.08% 37.28% 42.40% 49.56% 58.06%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −15.81% −16.71% −13.61% −9.25% −4.11%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PFL) −1.94% −1.27% 2.61% 7.92% 14.15%
Greater mortality rates (SPML03) −4.65% −4.98% −1.65% 3.17% 8.80%
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Table 2: Sensitivity analysis of the Relative Price Difference (R) in Scenario c and Sce-
nario d
R
Age of decision making
25 35 45 55 65
Scenario c
HB baseline 119.85% 70.90% 34.63% 8.88% −3.60%
HB sensitivity analysis
Lower interest rate (r = 1%) −16.72% −21.24% −24.52% −25.72% −20.00%
Higher interest rate (r = 5%) 459.09% 258.56% 133.05% 55.51% −13.59%
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 158.52% 99.11% 54.99% 23.17% 4.82%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) 72.42% 35.90% 9.01% −9.46% −14.76%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 212.74% 143.11% 91.51% 54.89% 34.08%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) 89.74% 47.50% 16.20% −6.02% −15.81%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PFL) 127.53% 76.68% 38.95% 12.01% −1.94%
Greater mortality rates (SPML03) 125.75% 75.34% 37.96% 11.29% −4.65%
Scenario d
HB baseline 4.32% 5.41% 6.52% 7.15% −3.60%
HB sensitivity analysis
Lower interest rate (r = 1%) −13.42% −12.51% −11.59% −11.07% −20.00%
Higher interest rate (r = 5%) 22.93% 24.21% 25.52% 26.26% 13.59%
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 40.37% 39.12% 36.96% 32.21% 4.82%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) 37.28% 35.26% 31.82% 24.40% −14.76%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 45.31% 46.85% 48.44% 49.33% 34.08%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −8.97% −8.03% −7.07% −6.53% −15.81%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PFL) 7.65% 8.68% 9.69% 10.04% −1.94%
Greater mortality rates (SPML03) 6.84% 7.89% 8.92% 9.34% −4.65%
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